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Abstract 
 
Over the past 20 years creative nonfiction has emerged around the world as a genre highly popular 
with both publishers and readers. Some compelling examples have helped redefine how experi-
ence and actuality can be imaginatively narrated and have freed nonfiction writers from previous 
constraints. As a reader I relish these innovative texts; as a writer I have tried to make use of some 
of the new freedoms. Most of the controversy surrounding the genre has centred on accuracy and 
ethics in memoir: now that the boundary between fiction and nonfiction is no longer so heavily 
policed, how far can a writer go? Indeed, does anything now go? This paper explores outstanding 
recent examples of life writing but also disturbing instances; it also examines a variety of views 
among memoirists about the role of the imagined in life writing. While recognising that the notion 
of a unitary and stable self is a fiction, I take issue with what I see as postmodern legitimisation 
of assumed identities and argue that, when this is extended even to fake Holocaust memoirs, it 
risks fuelling Holocaust revisionism and denial. 
 
Keywords: life writing; creative nonfiction; memoir; Holocaust memoir; fake memoir 
——— 
Creative Nonfiction (CNF), the subject of this paper, is a curious term exported from the 
USA over the past 15 years or so—curious in that it defines a genre by what it is not. It is 
curious, too, in being both an oxymoron and a tautology: an oxymoron because creative 
writing and nonfiction are usually defined in opposition to each other rather than con-
joined, and a tautology because all writing is—or should be—creative. 
CNF came to prominence as part of the Master of Fine Arts programmes that are so 
popular in the USA. It is a hybrid, supposedly bringing together aspects of fiction and 
nonfiction: nonfiction’s focus on real-life events and experiences—things that have actu-
ally taken place—with some of the features and characteristics of fiction such as story-
telling and narrative, characters, scenes and dialogue. 
We could do worse than use the American writer David Foster Wallace’s definition: 
As nonfiction, the works are connected to actual states of affairs in the world, are 
“true” to some reliable extent. If, for example, a certain event is alleged to have 
occurred, it must really have occurred; if a proposition is asserted, the reader ex-
pects some proof of (or argument for) its accuracy. At the same time, the adjec-
tive creative signifies that some goal(s) other than sheer truthfulness moti-
vates the writer and informs her work [...] Creative also suggests that this kind of 
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nonfiction tends to bear traces of its own artificing; the essay’s author usu-
ally wants us to see and understand her as the text’s maker. (Foster Wallace 
[2003] 2014) 
This approach has been deployed in a variety of texts, from life writing (biography, auto-
biography and memoir), travel writing, nature writing, science writing, crime writing, 
sports writing to history. Over the past 20 years it has emerged around the world as one 
of the most popular genres among both publishers and readers. For a recent chapter on 
the cancer memoir (Karpf 2013a), for example, I read twenty-five examples (and there 
were plenty more that I could have selected).  
The most compelling examples of CNF have helped redefine how experience and ac-
tuality can be imaginatively narrated. CNF isn’t new—life writing has been traced back 
to St Augustine, whose Confessions are widely considered the first Western autobiog-
raphy (Augustine 430 AD), and Rousseau’s Confessions (1782), while Orwell (1933, 
1937 and 1938) and Capote (1966) were renowned 20th century exponents. But in its more 
recent manifestations it allows writers to explore the most personal, individual and inti-
mate stories while also providing a means through which readers can hook their own, 
quite different experience: many of the best of them have this dual quality—a manifest 
story and a meta one. So Helen MacDonald’s H is for Hawk (2014) is both the story of 
the training of a falcon (a subject in which—at least before I read her eloquent book—I 
had absolutely no interest) and what you might call a biography of bereavement (a subject 
in which I am mightily interested): the story of how, through her experiences with the 
falcon, she came to terms with the death of her father.  
Or there is Paul Auster, who audaciously wrote his memoir Winter Journal entirely in 
the second person. This is how it starts: 
You think it will never happen to you, that it cannot happen to you, that you are 
the only person in the world to whom none of these things will ever happen, and 
then, one by one, they all begin to happen to you, in the same way they happen 
to everyone else. 
Your bare feet on the cold floor as you walk to the window. You are six years 
old. Outside snow is falling. (2012, 1) 
How masterfully the second person shifts: in the first paragraph (“you think it will never 
happen to you”) the reader assumes that the writer is addressing them personally, address-
ing their narcissism, their sense that somehow they alone can escape the intolerable real-
ities of the human condition before discovering that life will eventually have its way with 
them—only for the second person to shift in the second paragraph (“your bare feet on the 
cold floor”) to Auster’s own memories. But by then it is too late: he has already locked 
the reader's memory into his own—writer and reader are hopelessly entangled. 
Other examples of CNF create new ways of seeing and speaking. The Iceberg by Mar-
ion Coutts (2014), a memoir of her husband’s diagnosis and eventual death from a brain 
tumour (he also wrote a memoir about his cancer called Until Further Notice I am Alive 
[2012]), is a stunning account of how an individual and a family can remain fully them-
selves until his final breath. By turns beautiful and shocking (and often both at the same 
time), this memoir finds a fresh voice through which to describe the process of accompa-
nying a loved one to the grave. Coutts is an artist and her book is characterised by its 
close observation of experience: 
Spring. There is going to be destruction: the obliteration of a person, his intellect, 
his experience and his agency. I am to watch it. This is my part. There is no de-
serving or undeserving. There is no better and no worse. Cold has pained the 
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ground for months. Now the garden is bursting and splitting. From the window 
each morning I mark the naked clay ceding to green. I am against lyricism, against 
the spring, against all growth, against all fantasies, against all nature. Blast growth 
and all the things that grow. It is irrelevant, stupid, a waste. As nature is indiffer-
ent to me, so am I to it. (2014, 90)  
Growth as connected with spring and renewal but also, in case of a brain tumour, with 
death. 
The rest of this paper could be devoted to compelling passages from innovative recent 
examples of CNF, but this would be to ignore the more problematic aspects of this flour-
ishing genre. For, while there are countless examples of brilliant writing, its sheer prolif-
eration, especially in the field of life writing, deserves some attention. As someone—I 
can’t recall or trace whom—once astringently observed “everyone has a life, but does 
everyone have to write about it?” The answer increasingly seems to be yes. 
The number and range of memoirs suggest that something distinctive is going on. On 
one level it can be read as simply an example of the democratisation of discourse: where 
once you needed to be a prominent politician, actor, celebrity or military figure to be 
thought to merit a biography or autobiography, now the lives of ordinary people are the 
subject-matter of memoir. In this sense the growth of life writing can be seen as a parallel 
development to the emergence of oral history in the 1960s, 70s and 80s: giving voice to 
the voiceless. 
Yet this is too simple a formulation. The explosion of memoirs seems to be in some 
way connected with the growth of that much-maligned phenomenon called identity poli-
tics.  The notion that we each possess a unique, individual sensibility is a relatively recent 
belief—in part driven by Freudianism and the growth of psychoanalysis. The philosopher 
Charles Taylor has argued that modern identity is characterized by an emphasis on its 
inner voice and capacity for authenticity—that is, the ability to find a way of being that 
is somehow true to oneself (Taylor 1994). The political theorist Sonia Kruks went further: 
What makes identity politics a significant departure from earlier, pre-identarian 
forms of the politics of recognition is its demand for recognition on the basis of 
the very grounds on which recognition has previously been denied: it is qua 
women, qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups demand recognition. The demand 
is not for inclusion within the fold of “universal humankind” on the basis of 
shared human attributes; nor is it for respect “in spite of” one’s differences. Ra-
ther, what is demanded is respect for oneself as different. (2001, 85) 
Much of the appeal of the modern memoir—and its attraction for my own students, it 
seems to me—lies in its potential to provide them with this kind of recognition and vali-
dation. Whether they get published or not (but especially if they do), committing their 
lives to paper provides them with a kind of legitimation: not so much writing-as-therapy, 
a cathartic process through which they can free themselves from difficult experiences or 
toxic events, but more writing-as-acknowledgement, by which they can persuade other 
people to see them through the prism of a disadvantaged identity or an experience of 
suffering. 
Cynics dismiss this as a variant of the culture of complaint or the search for victim-
hood. Certain there has been an inflation of the kind of suffering required to make your 
mark in the crowded ‘misery lit’ market, redolent of the famous Monty Python sketch in 
which Four Yorkshiremen compete for victimhood, culminating in the account by one of 
them of “working twenty-nine hours a day down mill [...] and when we got home, our 
Dad would kill us, and dance about on our graves singing ‘Hallelujah’.” 
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This hilarious scenario of spiralling absurdist misery actually has something serious to 
tell us about a paradox: that ordinary lives increasingly need to exhibit extraordinary char-
acteristics and depict extreme situations to get attention, thereby running the risk of mar-
ginalising them—at least in publishing terms—once again (even if the ubiquity of the 
blog now makes each of us potentially our own publisher and thus provides a way of 
bypassing traditional forms of publishing). 
The emphasis on feelings as a marker of authenticity is also relatively recent. As Rich-
ard Sennett has noted, “before the 19th Century, the realm close to the self was not thought 
to be a realm for the expression of unique or distinctive personality; the private and the 
individual were not yet wedded. The peculiarities of individual feeling had as yet no so-
cial form because, instead, the realm close to the self was ordered by natural, ‘universal’ 
human sympathies” ([1977] 1993, 89). 
Yet Philip Lopate, who teaches creative nonfiction at Columbia, has remarked upon 
the fact that his students today want to write only about their feelings and are highly re-
sistant to his attempts to get them to use their minds, intellects and curiosity as the driver 
of their writing. He suggests that this is in part because of their fear of appearing judg-
mental, but I want to suggest that it is also because authenticity is seen increasingly to lie 
exclusively in the realm of affect: it is only through the display of powerful emotions that, 
it is often believed, we can lay claim to authenticity and individuality, indeed personhood. 
Yet there is something else in operation here too. Writing about his own work, Lopate 
has observed that “the more I took to writing personal essays, the more experienced I 
became in projecting in print the appearance of a stable, unitary self—a core around which 
the different elected tonalities of the moment could spin [...] writing is the way of self-
making” (Lopate 2013, 92; 100). 
This recalls the claim by the British writer, Alan Bennett, that “you don’t put yourself 
in what you write, you find yourself there” (2005, 545). In an era when identity has be-
come both so problematised and destabilised, perhaps writing offers the hope—the chi-
mera?—of creating some kind of ongoing self, with all the contours and heft of individ-
uality.  
Of course it is a forlorn hope, one that writing can never fulfil. The cancer patient, for 
example, who yearns to somehow distance themselves from their illness by transforming 
it into a text, a vehicle that they can shape and so reassert a measure of control, invariably 
reaches a point of recognition—either in print or their life—that writing about cancer 
cannot cure it (see Karpf 2013a). The life writer can only go so far: their life or illness 
escapes the confines of the page or screen and resolutely refuses to be tamed by words. 
CNF, however, has become a problematic genre not just on account of its popularity 
or the fantasies that it excites but which it cannot ultimately deliver. CNF’s hybridity has 
attracted fevered debate ever since the publication of Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan 
(1999),  Edmund Morris’s biography of President Ronald Reagan which included fic-
tional elements, as well as  a semi-fictional character coming from the same town as 
Ronald Reagan who went by the name of Edmund Morris himself. (This, of course, had 
already become a recurring feature of the postmodern novel: remember Martin Amis 
[1984] writing himself into his novel Money as a minor character?).  
The heated controversy that Dutch generated when it was first published tells us some-
thing about where the boundary between fiction and nonfiction lay at the end of the 20th 
century. Yet, incrementally, such techniques have become normalised. I have made use 
of some of the new freedoms available to non-fiction writers in my own writing, albeit in 
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pretty tame fashion compared with Morris. In my memoir, The War After ([1996] 2008), 
for instance, I sandwiched a densely-researched and heavily-footnoted section in between 
chapters of highly personal memoir. It was first published in 1996 by when, I had as-
sumed, we were all postmodern enough to be able to accommodate such contrasting nar-
ratives within a single whole. I was wrong: some reviewers were thrown by it and sig-
nalled their discomfort in different ways. 
Authors have taken up a variety of positions about just how creative you can be in 
CNF. Edmund White places himself in the absolutist camp. “I hate the phrase ‘creative 
nonfiction.’ It sounds like a synonym for lying. You have to tell the truth when you’re 
writing what purports to be memoir” (White 2016). 
Dave Eggers in his tour-de-force A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius (2000), 
published just a year after Dutch, refused this kind of distinction and got away with it—
partly because he was not writing about an American president, only about himself, but 
also because he made a feature of his slipperiness, gleefully importing the unreliable nar-
rator from fiction into nonfiction. “The author would [...] like to acknowledge his propen-
sity to exaggerate. And his propensity to fib in order to make himself look better, or worse, 
whichever serves his purpose at the time” (2000, xxxix). Eggers’s defence was his hyper-
bole and playfulness. 
Geoff Dyer, one of the most successful British creative nonfiction authors, is also en-
tirely unapologetic. “All that matters is that the reader can't see the joins, that there is no 
textural change between reliable fabric and fabrication. In other words, the issue is not 
accuracy but aesthetics” (Dyer et al. 2015). 
Karl Ove Knausgaard calls his books ‘autobiographical novels’ and refuses the dis-
tinction between the two words, seeing their marriage as essentially harmonious. “For me 
there has been no difference in remembering something and creating something... It was 
like I was writing a straight novel when I was writing this but the rule was that it had to 
be true. Not true in an objective sense but the way I remember it. There’s a lot of false 
memory in the book but it’s there because it’s the way it is, it’s real” (in Dyer et al. 2015). 
Here reality is elided entirely with subjectivity and subjectivity trumps—sorry—any 
form of verification. It rather akin to what the American satirist Stephen Colbert called 
‘truthiness,’ a word he coined during George W Bush’s presidency. “It used to be,” he 
maintained, that “everyone was entitled to their opinion but not their own facts. But that’s 
not the case anymore. Facts matter not at all. Perception is everything. It’s certainty” (in 
Schudson 2009, 107).  He was writing, of course, before the 2016 American election, 
which seems to have marked the moment where truthiness became deproblematised. 
So where does this take us? Listen to James Frey’s disclaimer, after the fictional ele-
ments of his supposed memoir A Million Little Pieces were exposed:  
I embellished many details about my past experiences, and altered others in order 
to serve what I felt was the greater purpose of the book...I made other alterations 
in my portrayal of myself, most of which portrayed me in ways that made me 
tougher and more daring and aggressive than in reality I was, or I am. There is 
much debate now about the respective natures of works of memoir, nonfiction, 
and fiction... I believe, and I understand that others strongly disagree, that memoir 
allows the writer to work from memory instead of from a strict journalistic or 
historical standard. It is about impression and feeling, about individual recollec-
tion. (Frey 2003, note to reader in reprint) 
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On the one hand this appears to be a mea culpa—but at the same time it appeals to the 
primacy of feeling. See how feeling is invoked here as a justification for deliberate dis-
honesty, and impression is cited rather than impression-management. Frey certainly cre-
ated a stable, unitary self—and it was one seemingly pretty far from the self that he was 
saddled with: but if I feel this is true, he suggested, that is legitimacy enough. 
When it comes to the Holocaust, such a stance becomes even more problematic. Con-
sider the case of one Mischa Defonseca, the author of a fake memoir of the Second World 
War. She was later ordered to pay $22.5m (£13.3m) back to her publisher for her book 
(1997) describing a frankly inconceivable, not to say preposterous, sequence of events 
that supposedly unfolded after the author, aged six, set off across Belgium, Germany and 
Poland to find her Jewish parents who had been captured by the Nazis and en-route was 
adopted by a pack of wolves—a kind of Anne Frank meets the Jungle Book. 
The story was a huge bestseller but in 2008 was found to have been fabricated. The 
author, who was not Jewish and whose real name was Monique De Wael, insisted 
that “it’s not the true reality, but it is my reality [...]. Ever since I can remember, I felt 
Jewish” (Flood 2014).  
Or there is the case of the black activist Rachel Dolezal who, it transpired, was actually 
born white. She tried to make an analogy with Caitlyn Janner and suggested that it was 
possible to be ‘trans-race’ (although her case was not exactly strengthened by the fact that 
in 2002 she had sued Howard University, a historically black institution, for allegedly 
discriminating against her because she was white. She lost the case). In her defence she 
claimed that “[a]s long as I can remember, I saw myself as black” (McGreal 2015). 
Closer to home, for me, was the case of Binjamin Wilkomirski. In 1998 The Guardian 
sent me to interview (Karpf 1998) Binjamin Wilkomirski, author of an acclaimed sup-
posed Holocaust memoir by a child survivor of Majdanek (Wilkomirski 1997), who was 
later unearthed as Bruno Dösseker, b. Bruno Grosjean, and a Protestant from Switzerland. 
I was moved by both book and author, despite some fleeting concerns that I did not 
allow more than whispering room for reasons that I elaborate elsewhere (Karpf 2013b). 
(It is hard to recover these on exactly the scale that they struck me at the time, so tempting 
is it to place oneself retrospectively in the ‘doubters’ camp.) One’s reading of any text is 
shaped by many factors: in this case, mine could be said to have been overdetermined. 
The book arrived already lionised as a memoir, which seemed a guarantor of its facticity. 
Its very fragmentariness seemed to mimic the broken nature of memory and in particular 
a child’s memory, lending it further authenticity. We also need to remember that it was 
1998: this was the Holocaust story, perhaps, that was yearned for as the century in which 
the Holocaust took place was drawing to a close—the story of the child who survived 
what Anne Frank did not, who could take the ‘late born’ into the next century and which, 
with its impressionistic structure and absence of strict chronology, constituted the perfect 
‘postmodern’ text.  
Yet listen to how Leslie Morris characterised Wilkomirski’s book and similar fake 
Holocaust memoirs. Such texts, she wrote are “poised between fact and fiction; experi-
ence and imagination; the immediacy of lived, remembered experience and mediated, 
transmitted, imagined memory [...]” (Morris 2002, 293). Drawing on Andrea Liss’s no-
tion of ‘post-memory’ (Liss 1998) which was later developed by Marianne Hirsch (2012), 
she argues that “postmemory takes as a given that the nature of memory itself is mediated 
[well, of course], never transparent [yes to this too] [...]” (Morris 2002, 293). It is worth 
quoting this at length: 
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This notion of postmemory insists on the impossibility of a transparent relation-
ship to the past and to language, announcing itself as artifact, as mediated between 
the various layers and levels of memory - experiential and textual. Postmemory, 
as I am using the term, is memory that cannot be traced back to the Urtext of 
experience, but rather unfolds as part of an ongoing process of intertextuality, 
translation, metonymic substitution, and a constant interrogation of the nature of 
the original. (Morris 2002, 293)  
She calls these ‘postmemoirs.’ “Memoirs as postmemoirs—such as those by Wilko-
mirski—all point to their own status (and failed status) as memoir, thus signaling their 
participation in the elegiac mourning for the loss of viability of poetic and narrative form” 
(Morris 2002, 293). 
Excuse me? 
It gets worse: The discursive space of ‘the Holocaust’ (now in inverted commas) “now 
encompasses texts that explore the uncertainty of authorship, experience and identity and 
the slippage not only between national and ethnic identities, but also between fact and 
fiction, between trauma and recovery, between Jew and non-Jew, and between victim and 
perpetrator” (Morris 2002, 294). 
So here we have it: the postmodern Holocaust, the Holocaust reduced to simulacrum—
parallel to Baudrillard’s “the Gulf War did not exist,” this in some sense is the Holocaust 
that did not exist. 
Morris happily continues: “Not only does the breakdown of form point to the post-
modern mantra of the historicity of narrative and the narrativity of history, but even more 
significantly [...] the Wilkomirski’s case, in [...] [its] apparently blatant disregard for the 
‘author,’ raises the question of what happens to truth claims when they are made by a 
fictive, invented Jewish subject” (Morris 2002, 300-301). 
I think I can answer that: they are fictive and invented, and fuel Holocaust denial. 
Call me old-fashioned if you will—I am certainly not a positivist (a post-post-modernist 
maybe?), but I do not think that Wilkomirski was exploring the uncertainty of author-
ship, or the slippage between Jew and non-Jew, between victim and perpetrator: he was 
a non-Jew and a lying one, who tried to appropriate other people’s experiences for his 
own purposes and found—for a multiplicity of reasons—a willing public. I have written 
recently (Karpf 2017b) about the growing phenomenon of ‘victim envy,’ the envy of 
victimhood and its appropriation by people who use it as a place to park their own sense 
of grievance. Wilkomirski is surely a prime example. 
I have re-read Morris’s characterisation of ‘postmemoir’ a number of times, hoping 
somehow to find in it a formulation I can live with. She is describing the discursive 
space of the Holocaust, after all—and I understand this. I also understand something 
that she does not dwell on, which is that Fonseca and Wilkomirski’s books were pub-
lished just at the point where the Holocaust was emerging out from 50 years of relative 
invisibility: it thus became culturally available as a trope for suffering (Young 1988) 
while offering a valuable identity in the also simultaneously emerging identity wars. 
But the idea that Wilkomirski’s text is part of a continuum whereby truth bleeds into 
fiction does a terrible disservice not only to the victims and survivors of the Holocaust 
but also to the historians and archivists working to produce the most accurate accounts 
possible. It also risks fuelling Holocaust revisionism and denial. 
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Morris’s formulation reminds me of Clemenceau’s discussion in the 1920s of who 
bore responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. According to Hannah Ar-
endt, when he was asked what future historians would think about it, Clemenceau re-
plied: “This I don’t know. But I know for certain that they will not say Belgium invaded 
Germany” (Arendt [1967] 2003, 554). 
Of course all texts are problematic. Nicholas Chare and Dominic Williams, in a bril-
liant recent book, have forensically analysed the Scrolls of Auschwitz, testimony written 
by members of the Sonderkommando—those Jews required to transport the bodies of 
Jews from the gas chambers to the ovens (Chare and Williams 2016). They have shown 
how, even in extremis, with the urgent need to bear witness, these writers were making 
decisions concerning style and address which it is appropriate to investigate and which, 
indeed, enhance our understanding and appreciation of how remarkable these documents 
are. We should not, therefore, allow the sensitivity of the subject matter to close off dis-
cussion of approach, form and register. 
I am not arguing, either, that we sacralise the Holocaust or embalm it. On the contrary, 
as Maurice Halbwachs remarked, “it is in society that people normally acquire their mem-
ories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize and localise their memories [...] the 
past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present” (Halbwachs 1993, 
38; 40). Halbwachs placed individual memory always in collective memory and social 
frameworks—an approach that his translator called ‘presentist’ (Halbwachs 1993, 25). 
Indeed I would go so far as to argue that as the ‘remembering self’ changes so, naturally, 
does the ‘remembered self.’ If we reject the idea of the unitary, stable self then we also 
see that memoir must inevitably be provisional and subject to revision. 
So common has this repeated self-presentation become that it has acquired its own 
moniker, the ‘serial memoir.’ According to Stamant, this developed in the second half of 
the 20th century in tandem with postmodern thought and changes in technology. “It is a 
postmodern form of self-representation: relational, experimental, historical and perma-
nently shifting [...] Serial memoir is a textual, material manifestation of a larger serial 
culture, marking a crucial shift in how people understand themselves and narrate their life 
stories” (Stamant 2014, 2).  
Yet, while I accept the argument that memoir is always contingent, its production lo-
cated in a particular historical and cultural moment, and that the life story is always an 
interpretive process, rather than the product of a stable entity or selfhood; while I believe 
that we need to defend memoir as a living, breathing form (Karpf 2017a), I refuse to go 
down the Leslie Morris route. I do not believe that Defonseca and Wilkomirski signalled 
their ‘participation in the elegiac mourning for the loss of viability of poetic and narrative 
form.’ On the contrary, I think they falsely laid claim to those forms and, in so doing, 
tried to reify rather than deconstruct them: to return to Foster Wallace’s definition quoted 
above, these authors try to efface and not embrace their own artificing. The angry reaction 
by readers and survivors to their unmasking suggests that these, too, have some lingering 
faith in the viability of those forms.  
To conclude: not all experience is a mirage; not all narrative forms play a part in their 
own immolation. We need to resist the defactualisation of the memoir as much as we 
contest what Arendt (1972) called the defactualisation of politics. 
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